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Abstract: Forecasts from Country choices, South-South partnerships and Clinton Foundation-UNITAID coalition show 
that present policies for brand ARVs are at the risk of flop in emerging South markets such as India, China, Thailand and 
Brazil. 
The dynamics explored in this article highlight the risks the originator companies are running in the emerging markets, 
along with their interest in direct agreements with the generic industry for the manufacturing and marketing of ARVs. 
Resulting information here would suggest the brand enterprises: 
-  To look for fast registration of their ARVs by regulatory authorities in all countries enlisted for differential   
pricing. 
-  To secure all formulations differentiated prices. 
-   To align with the Clinton-UNITAID prices for the corresponding generics. 
-  To pursue flexible negotiations with the generic companies to secure both counterparts long-term advantages.
INTRODUCTION 
  Generic companies are supplying the developing coun-
tries (sometimes through Compulsory Licensing-CL) with 
cheap copies of brand antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) for HIV 
infection [1, 2]. Brand companies, in turn, have marketed all 
newer ARVs, stipulated Voluntary Licenses-VLs with ge-
neric firms, pursued differential pricing, and not enforced 
patents in some cases. 
  Unfortunately, newer drugs are under patent in India and 
other supplier countries (India applied on 1
st January 2005 
the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property-TRIPS 
rules of the World Trade Organization-WTO) [1]; moreover, 
CL has resulted in pressure from brand industries and 
wealthy countries, VLs only account for small fraction pro-
curement, while differential pricing has failed to meet the 
promised coverage due to sometimes delayed drug registra-
tion in entitled countries [1, 2]. Eventually, non-enforcement 
policies have been implemented at the brand company dis-
cretion only [2]. 
  As a result, unaffordable prices still bar the end-users in 
the resource-poor countries from accessing these lifesaving 
drugs. Under this backcloth, prospects from Country choices, 
South-South partnerships and Clinton-UNITAID coalition 
show that current trade policies for brand ARVs by private 
pharmaceutical sector are at the risk of flop in emerging 
markets in the South [3]. 
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COUNTRY CHOICES 
  Section 3 (d) of the Indian Patent Act denies patentability 
to “a new form of a known substance” unless it results in 
“enhancement of the known efficacy” [4]. Coherently, In-
dia’s Patent Office could reject the pending Abbott’s patent 
application for heat stable lopinavir/r (LPV/r). If so, the In-
dian firms would be allowed to continue manufacturing the 
corresponding copy. Noteworthy, the same Office very re-
cently refused as “evergreening” a Boehringer-Ingelheim’s 
patent application for nevirapine (NVP) syrup. 
  These insights take into account the recent withdrawal by 
Glaxo SmithKline and Novartis of patent applications for 
ARVs in India, after the Indian Court rejected (August 2007) 
a Novartis challenge to the mentioned Section of Law [5, 6]. 
In the meanwhile, the US Patent Office rejection (January 
2008) of already enforced Gilead’s tenofovir (TDF) patents 
in USA will likely compel the company to withdraw patent 
application in India based on predictable rejection by the In-
dian Patent Office too [7]. 
  This scenario includes the currently working Indian 
AIDS Control Organization’s (NACO) plan to provide 5,000 
first-line resistant people with second-line Indian generic 
ARVs for free [8]. 
  Why, in such a context, should the Indian government 
grant the multinationals their patent applications, so disre-
garding substantial home interests? 
  China currently produces first-line ARVs along with the 
active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) for second lines 
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poor world because of its cheapest APIs and industrial scale-
up very interested in the under-served markets. Unequivocal 
choices are lacking, however, between pursuance of TRIPS 
flexibilities of WTO (which China belongs to) [1] and huge 
business with the multinational giants (including direct price 
cuttings for brand ARVs). 
  To date, the government has snobbed the Indian ARVs 
even though they are cheapest through the Clinton Founda-
tion, a consortium which China is a member of. How much 
longer will it be worthwhile to Chinese government ignoring 
the saving money opportunities by Indian generics? Not for 
long, if China-India trade agreements of November 2006 and 
January 2008 are supposed to give rise to a mutually profit-
able partnership for ARVs manufacturing and marketing. 
  The USA-India strategic partnership, boosted by the 
“civil nuclear power” agreement of March 2006 [9], has re-
sulted in exploitation of Indian ARVs inside the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), with more than 
52 Indian generic ARVs approved to date by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). In such a perspective it may be 
worth underscoring that US Patent Office rejection of 
Gilead’s TDF patents, as mentioned before, came just after 
FDA had approved Indian Matrix copy for use in PEPFAR 
[10]: do the strategy balances in South-East Asia weigh now 
more than brand drug patent defence inside the partnership 
with India? 
  In October 2007, Canada notified WTO a CL authorising 
Canadian manufacturer Apotex to produce WHO (World 
Health Organization) pre-qualified fixed-dose combination 
(FDC) copies of three patented ARVs for export to Rwanda: 
this was the first time a generic firm in the developed world 
engaged to secure ARVs an African country [11]. 
  Brazil imports brand ARVs at the lowest prices, but the 
steadily enhanced purchase has more than doubled the ex-
penditure, indicating that the costs for ARVs will continue to 
climb [12]. The country still purchases heat stable LPV/r 
from Abbott at US$1000 person/year: definitely a too expen-
sive price comparing to an Indian copy available through the 
Clinton Foundation (which Brazil belongs to) at $695! 
  Why shouldn’t Brazil take advantage of Clinton opportu-
nities? Possibly it is ready, while only waiting for rejection 
of Abbott’s patent application for heat stable LPV/r in India. 
This couples with a Ministry of Health’s decree on 9 April 
2008 signalling that Brazil might reject patent request for 
Gilead’s TDF (due to its high cost), and import a generic 
copy [13]. 
  Should these prospects come true, Abbott and Gilead 
would lose Brazilian HIV/AIDS market. 
  Following past government’s CL policy against Merck’s 
efavirenz (EFV) and Abbott’s LPV/r, Thailand imports EFV 
and heat stable LPV/r as generics from India and has planned 
for domestic manufacturing: in the meantime, it has been 
placed on the USA Priority Watch List [14]. Would Thailand 
be up to resisting? It looks like it would be because: 1) the 
country can import ARVs from Indian manufacturers or the 
Clinton Foundation (whose consortium is part), 2) it can rely 
on favourable international balances, while enjoying the ad-
vantages from South-South partnerships, 3) the new coalition 
government, started on February 2008, looks like it would be 
prone to go on with CL policy [15]. If these forecasts were 
fulfilled, the brand companies should give up Thailand. 
SOUTH-SOUTH PARTNERSHIPS 
  Partnerships (between country governments or generic 
drug companies) for building ARVs plants are mushrooming 
in Africa, where they fall into the African Union and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
self-sufficiency plans (Fig. 1) [16, 17]. These partnerships 
might, in the future, undermine markets to the brand corpo-
rations, while pushing them into flexible negotiations with 
 
Fig. (1). Generic ARVS by an African company (Pharmakina, Democratic Republic of Congo). 70    The Open AIDS Journal, 2008, Volume 2  Dionisio and Messeri 
the generic competitors. Actually, balanced VL agreements 
for the manufacturing of ARVs have already been signed: 
i.e. the Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) and Tibotec Pharma-
ceuticals agreements with Aspen Pharmacare of South Af-
rica, and the Roche agreements with Addis Pharmaceutical 
Factory of Ethiopia and Varichem Pharmaceuticals of Zim-
babwe [18-20]. 
  These opportunities are spurring the generic manufactur-
ers into innovation while insisting on VL deals with the 
brand industry to exploit know-how, training and technology 
transfer opportunities for developing new ARVs and gaining 
the wealthy markets. 
CLINTON-UNITAID COALITION 
  Clinton Foundation’s HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI) is 
lowering more and more the prices of generic ARVs by part-
nering with UNITAID. 
  As International Drug Purchase Facility primarily fi-
nanced from the proceeds of a tax levied on airline tickets, 
UNITAID is established to provide long-term funding to in-
crease access to drugs and diagnostics for HIV/AIDS, ma-
laria and tuberculosis in the resource-poor countries [21, 22]. 
  Concurrently, lists of countries on differential pricing 
have been arranged by Abbott, Boehringer-Ingelheim, Bris-
tol-Myers Squibb, Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck & Co. 
Inc, and Roche enterprises: regrettably, their prices are (with 
isolated exceptions) quite higher than the corresponding 
CHAI generics [23], with a perceivable risk by considering 
that: 
-  Some FDC ARVs, still produced by generic firms 
only (Table 1) [23], have been made available to the 
South markets just thanks to CHAI-UNITAID dis-
counts. 
-  Further countries are expected to join the presently 73 
Clinton Foundation members, so slashing prices due 
to enhanced bulk procurement of ARVs. 
TACKLING EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS 
  The dynamics analysed in this paper have highlighted the 
risks (bound up with their ARVs policies) the originator 
companies are running in the South markets, while remark-
ing, at the same time, their interest in VL agreements with 
the generic industry for the manufacturing and marketing of 
ARVs. Cross information here would suggest the brand en-
terprises: 
  To look for fast registration of their ARVs by regula-
tory authorities in all countries enlisted for differen-
tial pricing. 
  To secure all formulations differentiated prices. 
  To align with the prices of corresponding CHAI ge-
nerics (to enhance competition, based on CHAI is 
oriented towards WHO and /or FDA approved drugs). 
  To pursue flexible negotiations with the generic com-
panies to secure both counterparts long-term advan-
tages. 
Table 1.  Arv Drug Combinations Only Available as Generics 
 
  AZT/3TC/NVP: Adult formulations by Aspen, Apotex, Aurobindo, 
Cipla, Hetero, Matrix, Emcure, Ranbaxy, and Strides. The Clinton 
Foundation has negotiated reduced prices with Cipla and Matrix. 
Paediatric formulations by Government Pharmaceutical Organiza-
tion (GPO) and Ranbaxy. 
  D4T/3TC/NVP: The Clinton Foundation has negotiated with Het-
ero, Matrix, Cipla and Ranbaxy reduced prices for adult formula-
tions. Adult formulation also made by Emcure and Strides. Paediat-
ric formulations by Cipla, GPO, Emcure, and Ranbaxy. 
  D4T/3TC: Adult formulations by Aurobindo, Cipla, Hetero, Matrix, 
Ranbaxy, Emcure, and Strides. Paediatric formulations by Emcure 
and Ranbaxy. 
  D4T/3TC+EFV: Adult formulations by Cipla, Emcure, Strides and 
Ranbaxy. No paediatric formulations. 
  AZT/3TC+EFV: Adult formulations by Aurobindo, Cipla, Emcure, 
Ranbaxy, and Strides. No paediatric formulations. 
  PMTCT: NVP+AZT: Granule formulations by Strides. 
  TDF/3TC:  Adult formulation by  Matrix (reduced price in the 
Clinton Foundation’s consortium). Not for paediatric use. 
  TDF/3TC+EFV:  Adult formulation by Cipla. Not for paediatric 
use. 
  TDF/3TC/EFV: Adult formulation by Matrix (reduced price in the 
Clinton Foundation’s consortium). Not for paediatric use.  
AZT=zidovudine, 3TC=lamivudine, NVP=nevirapine, D4T=stavudine, EFV=efavirenz, 
TDF=tenofovir, PMTCT=prevention mother-to-child transmission. 
WHO prequalified ARVs (updated list) at http://healthtech.who.int/pq/status/Product 
Registry.aspx?list=ha 
 
CONTRIBUTORSHIP 
-  D. Dionisio conceived, designed and wrote the article. 
-  D. Messeri shared in the draft preparation and partici-
pated in overall interpretation, revision and harmoni-
sation. 
REFERENCES 
[1]  World Trade Organisation. Overview: the TRIPS Agreement. 
[cited 2008, July 5
th] 2005; Available from: http://www.wto.org/ 
English/tratop _e/trips_ e/intel2_e.htm. 
[2]  Chien CV. HIV/AIDS drugs for Sub-Saharan Africa: How do 
brand and generic supply compare? PLoS ONE 2007; 3: e278. In-
ternet: http://www.plosone.org (accessed January 2008). 
[3]  Dionisio D, Khanna AK, Nicolaou S, et al. For-profit policies and 
equitable access to antiretroviral drugs in resource-limited coun-
tries. Future HIV Therapy 2008; 2(1): 25-36. Internet: http://www. 
futuremedicine.com/toc/fht/2/1 (accessed January 2008). 
[4]  Revised Patent Law. [cited 2005, April 5
th]. Available from: 
http://www.patentoffice.nic. in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf  
[5]  GlaxoSmithKline withdraws patent applications for antiretrovirals 
Abacavir, Trizivir in India (Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report, 10 
December 2007). Available from: http://www.kaisernetwork.org/ 
DAILY_reports/print_report.cfm?DR_ID=49299&dr_cat.... 
[6]  Novartis patent challenge dismissed in India. ICTSD Bridges (5 
September 2007) vol 11 n. 29. Available from: http://www.ictsd. 
org/weekly/07-09-05/story3.htm 
[7]  US patent office’s rejection of Gilead’s antiretroviral patents might 
affect applications in India (Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report, 28 
January 2008). Available from: http://www.kaisernetwork.org/ 
DAILY_reports/print_report.cfm?DR_ID=50045&dr_cat....  
[8]  India to provide second-line antiretroviral access to about 5,000 HIV-
positive people beginning in January (Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Re-
port, 26 November 2007). Availabe from: http://www.kaiser net-
work.org/DAILY_reports/print_report.cfm?DR_ID=49018&dr_cat 
[9]  US, India clinch nuclear deal, call pact “historic” (2 March 2006). 
Available from: http://www.news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060302/ts_u 
sindiabushnuclearpoliticsdeal 
 Impending Flop for Brand Antiretrovirals in the Emerging Markets?  The Open AIDS Journal, 2008, Volume 2    71 
[10]  FDA tentatively approves Mylan’s generic version of antiretroviral 
Viread for use in PEPFAR (Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report, 5 De-
cember 2007). Available from: http://www.kaisernetwork.org/ 
DAILY_reports/print_report.cfm?DR_ID=49215&dr_cat.... 
[11]  Canadian WTO notification clears path for Rwanda to import ge-
neric HIV/AIDS drug. ICTSD Bridges (10 October 2007) vol 11 n. 
34. Available from: http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-10-10/story4. 
htm 
[12]  Nunn AS, Fonseca EM, Bastos FI, Gruskin S, Salomon J. Evolu-
tion of antiretroviral drug costs in Brazil in the context of free and 
universal access to AIDS treatment. PLoS Medicine 2007; 4: e305. 
Internet: http://www.plosmedicine.org (accessed December 2007). 
[13]  Brazil decrees Gilead’s tenofovir in “Public Interest” (Kaiser Daily 
HIV/AIDS Report, 14 April 2008). Available from: http://www. 
kaisernetwork.org/DAILY_REPORTS/print_report.cfm?DR_ID=5 
1500&.... 
[14]  Thailand’s FDA registers generic version of Abbott’s antiretroviral 
Aluvia for use under compulsory licensing program (Kaiser Daily 
HIV/AIDS Report, 17 October 2007). Available from: http://www. 
allafrica.com/stories/200710171005.html 
[15]  Wong-Anan N. Thailand will override cancer drug patents (10 
March 2008). Reuters. Available from: http://www.reuters.com/ 
articlePrint?articleId=USBKK14764720080310. 
[16]  Ugandan pharmaceutical plant begins production of generic antiret-
rovirals (Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report, 30 January 2008). Avail-
able from: http://www.kaisernetwork.org/DAILY_reports/print_ 
report.cfm?DR_ID=50107&dr_cat.... 
[17]  Africa plans to produce own drugs, reduce reliance on West. 
Agence France Press (11 April 2007). Available from: http:// 
news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070411/hl_afp/africanunionhealthdrugs_0
7041114245... 
[18]  Aspen and BMS conclude strategic ARV deal (16 February 2006). 
Available from: http:// www.sharedata.co.za/sens.asp?id=82577. 
[19]  Aspen Pharmacare, Tibotec enter agreement to distribute protease 
inhibitor Prezista in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS 
Report, 10 April 2007). Available from: http://www.kaisernetwork. 
org/Daily_reports/print_report.cfm?DR_ID=44130&dr_cat... 
[20]  Roche signs agreements with Ethiopian, Zimbabwean pharmaceu-
tical companies for antiretroviral production training (Kaiser Daily 
HIV/AIDS Report, 31 May 2007). Available from: http://www. 
kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/print_report.cfm?DR_ ID=45253& 
dr_cat... 
[21]  CHAI: Partner and procurement countries (accessed January 2008). 
Available from: http://www.clintonfoundation.org/partner-procure 
ment-countries.htm 
[22]  CHAI in partnership with UNITAID (cited 2008, February 20). 
Available from: http://www.clintonfoundation.org/cf-pgm-hs-ai-
partners2.htm 
[23]  Untangling the web of price reductions: A pricing guide for the 
purchase of ARVs in developing countries. 10
th ed, September 
2007: Campaign for access to essential medicines. Medecins Sans 
Frontieres. Geneva, Switzerland (updated 3
rd March 2008). Avail-
able from: http://www.accessmed-msf.org/main/hivaids/untang ling 
-the-web/ http:// www.access-med.msf.org 
 
 
Received: June 19, 2008  Revised: July 9, 2008  Accepted: July 11, 2008 
 
© Dionisio and Messeri; Licensee Bentham Open. 
 
This is an open access article licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc/3.0/) which permits unrestricted, non-commercial use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the work is properly cited. 
 
 